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The Disparate Treatment of Student and
Family Farmer Debtors: Suggestions for
Statutory Reform of Bankruptcy Policy
NANCY

H. KRATZKE* AND THOMAS 0. DEPPERSCHMIDT**
INTRODUCTION

The resolution of bankruptcy litigation involving individuals under the
government student loan programs and family farmers under Chapter 12 of
the Bankruptcy Code' ("Code") provides an intriguing insight into divergent
congressional policy. Such divergence is especially prominent in the
treatment of the "disposable income" concept under these two statutory
provisions.2 This thorny issue in all bankruptcy rehabilitation cases3 under
Chapters 11, 12, and 13" and in liquidation cases under Chapter 75 requires
measuring the amount of income the debtor has or likely will have available
to repay debts.

In student loan proceedings under the Code, many courts entertain the
standard of "subsistence" as the income level beyond which disposable

is absent in family
income arises, while the same standard (or any standard)

farmer Chapter 12 cases. This difference is the crux of the stricter
measurement of disposable income in educational loans than in farm loans.
The definition of disposable income in both areas of litigation chosen for
study here is significant, therefore, in tracking the problem of disposable
* B.A., M.A., University of Oklahoma; J.D., University of Memphis; Associate

Professor of Business Law, University of Memphis.
** A.B., Fort Hays Kansas State University; Ph.D., University of Texas; Professor of
Economics, University of Memphis.
The authors gratefully acknowledge editorial assistance and encouragement provided
by the Honorable David S. Kennedy, Chief Bankruptcy Judge for the Western District of
Tennessee.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-31 (1987).
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (1987) (defining "disposable income" for use in
Chapter 12); § 1325(b)(2) (1987) (defining "disposable income" for use in Chapter 13).
3. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1987) (business rehabilitation); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-31
(1987) (individuals); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (1987) (rehabilitation of family farmers).
4. Id.
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1986).
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income measurement in these two relatively new policy areas.6

This paper compares the uneven handling in bankruptcy litigation of
student loans with family farmer debts.7 Review of the definition of
disposable income and analysis of the differences in its measurement and
application under the "family farmer" and "student loan" provisions of the
Code are the principal tasks. The focus is on the definition of the "undue
hardship" test under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)(B) and its equivalent in Chapter 12
cases. We conclude with recommendations for Code revisions in four areas
concerning future bankruptcy policy: (1) substitute "abuse" for "undue
hardship" as the criterion for determining student loan dischargeability
issues; (2) allow for payment deferral of such obligations as an alternative
to discharge or exception to discharge; (3) require exhaustion of certain
remedies as a prerequisite for discharge; and (4) reconsider the concept of
"fresh start" as it applies to student debtors and family farmers.
A. HISTORY OF THE STUDENT LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM

The Higher Education Act of 1965 (hereinafter "Education Act")'
provides that the federal government shall be the guarantor of student loans.
Specifically, it establishes the Guaranteed Student Loan Program. The

6. There are important similarities as well as differences in these debtor groups.
Congress singled out these two groups for special treatment under the Code at the same time
that general provisions governing them remained. Both groups are relatively recent additions
to coverage under the Code: student loans were added to the Code in 1965, Pub. L. No. 89329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (repealed 1978)), and Chapter 12 was
enacted in 1986. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088, 3105 (1986) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-31
(1988)). Pub. L. No. 99-554, tit. III § 302(0, 100 Stat. 3124 (1986) provided for repeal of
Chapter 12 on October 1, 1993. The Sunset Provision was extended to October 1, 1998 by
Pub. L. No. 103-65, 107 Stat. 311 (Aug. 6, 1993). NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE, BANKRUPTCY CODE 1092 (1994-95 ed.). Policy judgments on the basic direction
of the legislation are still being developed for both groups in bankruptcy and judicial
decisions.
7. Prior to the Family Farmer Act of 1986, the term "farmer," at that time paragraph
(17) and now paragraph (20) in the Code, was derived from the Small Business Act and was
included for use in provisions dealing with prohibitions against involuntary cases against
farmers. Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice, Bankruptcy Code, p. 35 (1994-95 ed.).
The new family farmer definitions are found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(18) (1988) "family
farmer" and 101(18) "family farmer with regular annual income." Paragraph 18 deals with
the characteristics (amount and source) of debt covered under Chapter 12.
8. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (repealed
1978)).
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purpose of the Education Act is to "ensure that colleges and students
attending colleges would have reasonable access to low interest rate loans." 9
It is important to note that the benefit was designed for both institutions and
students. The basic loan procedure is for loans to be extended by banks,
credit unions, educational institutions, and other lenders. These loans are
then insured by the United States Department of Education or, in some
situations, by state agencies or nonprofit organizations, and then re-insured
by the Department of Education.'0 The insurance guarantee by the Department of Education means that if the borrower does not make repayments
because (1) of death or disability of the borrower or (2) the debt is
discharged in bankruptcy, the unpaid lender is entitled to payment from the
Department."
A feature of the 1965 Education Act, significant for later developments,
was that such loans were fully dischargeable in bankruptcy. 2 The absence
of constraints on dischargeability in bankruptcy led to widespread abuse of
the Education Act.'3 Student debtors who recently completed their courses
of study or prematurely left college for any reason were typically cash flow
poor, even though their future prospects for greater income were arguably
greatly enhanced by the education they had received as a result of the
loan.' 4 Indeed, bankruptcy filings by students shortly after leaving school
were done precisely because their financial condition was then worse than
what it was likely to be in the future. In such demonstrated unfavorable
financial circumstances, courts routinely discharged such debts. 5
To address this problem, the Educational Amendments of 1976
(effective on or after September 30, 1977) made student loans dischargeable
in bankruptcy only after five years. 16 The five-year period started on the
date beginning with the scheduled repayment period of the loan.' 7 The
only exception to the five-year discharge limitation was a finding of "undue
hardship" made by a bankruptcy court within that five-year period.' 8 This

9. In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 739 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing S. Rep. No. 673, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4027, 4030).
10. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1078, 1084, 1085(d) (1988)).
11. Id. at 740.
12. Id.

13. Id.at 742-43.

14. Id. at 743.
15. Id. at 742.
16. Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, tit. I § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081,
2141, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (repealed 1978).
17. Id.
18. Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

undue hardship exception could be found for the debtor or the debtor's
dependents.' 9
The 1976 legislation and its five-year rule containing the undue
hardship exception was repealed effective November 6, 1978.20 Meanwhile, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which became
effective on October 1, 1979, and which replaced the 1976 legislation.2'
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197822 again restricts dischargeability
of educational loans in bankruptcy cases. Section 523(a)(8) of the 1978 Act
states:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt-(8)

for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by
a governmental unit, or made under any program funded
in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution, unless-(A) such loan first became due before five years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this
paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the
23
debtor and the debtor's dependents;

The 1978 legislation is more comprehensive than the 1965 legislation.
The 1976 amendment to the 1965 Higher Education Act applied only to
loans insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit.24 The 1978 legislation
25
applies to loans made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit.

19. Id. Effectively, the student debtor had to defer seeking a discharge of the loan in
bankruptcy for five .years after the time the debtor was to start (by contract) repayment of
the loan. The exception to the five-year deferment was the "undue hardship" found during
the repayment period. Id.
20. Pub. L. 95-598, tit. I, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988). There was a "gap" period in the legislation of about
11 months during which most courts faced with the dischargeability of student loans held the
debts nondischargeable. See In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 740 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988).
24. Pub. L. No. 94-482, tit. I § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081 (1976), codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1087-3 (repealed 1978).

25. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988).
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The final substantive change in legislation affecting educational loans
in bankruptcy occurred on November 29, 1990 (with an effective date 180
days later on May 29, 1991), as part of the Crime Control Act of 1990.26
This legislation increases the time interval in § 523(a)(8)(A) from five to
seven years, meaning that the student debtor now may not commence a
bankruptcy case to discharge a student loan until seven years after the
beginning of the scheduled repayment period unless there is undue hardship
in making the repayment.
B. HISTORY OF CHAPTER 12, FAMILY FARMER BANKRUPTCY ACT

Congress enacted Title III of the Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 198621 (hereinafter referred
to as the "Bankruptcy Act"), to take effect on November 26, 1986. Before
it was allowed to lapse in October 1993, Congress, on August 6, 1993,
extended the Chapter 12 sunset date until October 1, 1998.29
The stated congressional intent of Chapter 12 is to give "family farmers
facing bankruptcy a fighting chance to reorganize their debts and keep their
land. 30 Before Chapter 12 was enacted, family farmers who sought to
reorganize (rather than liquidate under Chapter 7) could elect one of two
operative Code chapters: Chapter 11 "Reorganization" or Chapter 13
"Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income."
Chapter I l's reorganization scheme often proved to be too complicated,
time-consuming, and expensive for most farm debtors. 3' Before its
amendment, Chapter 13 required that the qualifying debtor's non-contingent,
liquidated, unsecured debts could not exceed $100,000 nor could
non-contingent, liquidated, secured debts exceed $350,000.32 Farm debts
often exceeded the statutory limit. In 1994, Chapter 13 was amended to
raise the debt limits for debtors (to $1,000,000, with a maximum of

26. Pub. L. No. 101-647, §§ 3621, 3631, 104 Stat. 4789, 4964-65, 4966 (1990).
27. Id. at 3631. The 1990 legislation also made student loans non-dischargeable in
Chapter 13 cases.
28. Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
29. Pub. L. No. 103-65, 107 Stat. 311 (1993). The extension legislation also made a
change in the requirements regarding filing of Chapter 12.
30. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5246, 5249.
31. Id. Chapter 11 also has an absolute priority rule for the unsecured "cramdown."
It permits involuntary liquidation through creditor plans. Farmers cannot sell portions of
their property readily.
32. 11 U.S.C. §109(e) (1988).
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$250,000 in unsecured debts and $750,000 in secured debts) and to make
the Chapter more accessible to all individual debtors.3"
The principal changes introduced in the' family farmer Chapter 12 are
new eligibility standards for a farmer filing bankruptcy4 and altered

adequate protection provisions affecting creditors. 35 These features
incorporate Congress' intended advantages for farm debtors over previous
bankruptcy law.

6

Congressional action in Chapter 12 to raise the debt

33. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-194, 108 Stat. 4106,
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (amended 1994). Under Chapter 13, the debtor may be
compelled to commit all disposable income to the plan for three years. 11 U.S.C. §
1325(b)(1)(B) (1988). The plan itself is limited to a period of three to five years. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1329(c) (1988).
34. To qualify under chapter 12, a family farmers' total aggregate debts cannot exceed
$1.5 million. (11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A) (1988).) In addition, 80% of an individual family
farmer's debts must have been incurred in farming, or 50% of his gross income in the taxable
year immediately preceding filing for bankruptcy must have been from farming. Id. §
101(17)(B)(ii) (1988). Partnerships and corporations must also meet the $1.5 million
limitation. Id. § 101(17)(B)(i) (1988). At least 80% of their assets must be related to the
farming operation. Id. § 101(17)(B)(i) (1988). At least 50% of the outstanding stock or
partnership equity must be held by a single family and its relations, and that family must
actually conduct the farming business. Id. § 101(17)(B) (1988).
At least 80% of a partnership's or corporation's debts must arise from the farming
business, but partnerships and corporations may not use the optional 50% gross income test.
Id. Corporations must meet the further requirement that their stock may not be publicly
traded. Id. § 101(17)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1988).
Family farmers must also have a "regular annual income." Id. § 109(f) (1982).
"Family farmer with regular annual income" means that a family farmer's income is
"sufficiently stable and regular to enable such family to make payments under a plan under
Chapter 12." Id. § 101(19) (1988).
35. The creditor's "adequate protection problem" is addressed by prohibiting payment
of opportunity costs (Diana Ryan, The Changing Standardsof Adequate Protection in Farm
Bankruptcy Reorganizations,37 DRAKE L. REV. 323, 340 (1988)) and by allowing creditors
reasonable rent payments on farm land instead (11 U.S.C. § 1205(b)(3) (1986).) See Nancy
Hisey Kratzke and Thomas 0. Depperschmidt, "ReasonableRent" and Opportunity Cost in
the Family FarmerBankruptcy Act, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 863 (1989-90).
36. The principal substantive advantages of Chapter 12 to the farm debtor over
Chapters 11 and 13 are that (a) the confirmation plan does not require creditor approval
(though the creditor can argue lack of feasibility), and (b) there can be no forced liquidation
since only the farmer may file under Chapter 12. Since agricultural financing is cyclical in
nature and family farmers entering bankruptcy are financially strapped, the Chapter 12
prohibition on opportunity costs often is cited as the key formal advantage over Chapter 11.
The other major advantage, though not new to bankruptcy proceedings, is the
stimulus Chapter 12 provides to informal negotiations to write down farm collateral values.
See, e.g., David H. Hahn, Chapter 12--The Long Road Back, 66 NEB. L. REV. 726, 733
(1987). These negotiations effect a reduction in a farmer's total indebtedness to the present
value of the security owned by the farmer as compared to one over 100%. Id. at 726.
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limits and streamline the reorganization procedure37 silences the major
objections of farmers to debt relief under the older statutory provisions. It
also protects the unsecured creditor. The Code guarantees that unsecured
creditors, as a condition of their being forced to share in the cost of farmer
reorganization, shall receive all "disposable income," if any, generated by
the farmer during the period of the typical three-to-five-year Chapter 12
38
plan.
C. THE DISPOSABLE INCOME ISSUE IN CASE LAW

The definition of disposable income payable to unsecured creditors is
one of the most troublesome economic issues in bankruptcy and is the focus
of the analysis that follows. In a general sense, disposable income may be
defined as the difference between the debtor's gross income and the sum of
reasonable living expenses, actual necessary business or operating expenses,
and other plan payments. 39 The difficult issue in this definition is what
amount of a debtor's reasonable and necessary expenses is to be subtracted
from gross income to get disposable income. The problem of measuring
disposable income, therefore, is the further definition of "reasonable" living
expenses and "appropriate" business expenses. This problem has generated
the disparate treatment of student loan debtors and family farmer debtors.
The kinds of expenses allowed as actual and necessary often depend on
their timing. The question of utilizing crop proceeds to pay disposable
income is an equitable issue that goes to the core of the rehabilitative
philosophy underlying Chapter 12. For example, the family farmer may use
this year's crop proceeds to finance the planting of next year's crop, thereby
denying some or all disposable income to creditors.
The use of crop proceeds can even be important in the year following
discharge. Even after discharge, a creditor is unable to demand repayment
if the nominally disposable income is allowed to be used by the farmer/debtor to plant his post-bankruptcy crops. It is most obvious in this case
that disposable income can be a fiction. It could be argued that Congress

37. Under Chapter 12 the reorganization process is speeded up. The farmer's
reorganization plan must be filed within 90 days of the petition; only substantial justification
warrants extension. 11 U.S.C. § 1221 (1986). The confirmation hearing is also expedited,
with the court urged to confirm or reject the plan in a hearing within 45 days of its filing.
11 U.S.C. § 1224 (1986). If the trustee or creditor does object to the plan, court approval
may depend on the payment of all of the debtor's disposable income under the plan. 11
U.S.C. § 1225 (1986).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (1986).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)-(B) (1986).
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never intended that a Chapter 12 debtor pay his unsecured creditors, since
typically there are never enough dollars to meet all the present and future
needs of a small family farmer. This treatment of disposable income,
however, clearly furthers the purpose of Chapter 12 to keep the family
farmer alive, financially speaking.
Timing also is an issue in student loan cases. A student debtor is not
allowed to discharge a student loan until seven years after the first payment
on the loan becomes due. 40 The only way around this statutory prohibition
is for the student to show "undue hardship."4' The student must show that
his or her income will provide only a subsistence standard of living. Any
support greater than subsistence will be disallowed for the student's personal
consumption or discretion in order to provide disposable income to repay the
student loan. By contrast, the family farmer is not required to show
hardship. The family farmer must demonstrate only a legitimate, farmrelated need for the money.
One purpose of a comparison of Chapter 12 and student loan cases in
this paper is to assess the judicial treatment of the two groups as to the
"forgiveness" of past debts through the definition of disposable income. If
no disposable income is distributed, that means that the debtor's personal or
business expenditures are approved, perhaps to encourage their increase. If
disposable income is found regularly for students with low incomes, and not
found for family farmers with much higher incomes, there is greater debt
forgiveness for farmers. Indeed, the forgiveness of past debts through
judicial definition of disposable income suggests that courts have been more
"kind" to farmers than to students.42
I. CASE LAW ON DISPOSABLE INCOME IN STUDENT LOANS
A. INTRODUCTION

Unlike its appearance in judicial decisions under Chapter 12 and
Chapter 13, the term "disposable income," as such, rarely is mentioned (even
superficially) in cases dealing with student loan dischargeability exceptions.
The courts, however, are really talking about it when determinations are

40. 11 U.S.C. § 523(8)(A) (1990).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 523(8)(B) (1988).

42. In reviewing court treatment of the two debtor groups, it is critical to note that the
absolute debt and disposable income numbers routinely are greater for farmers than for
students. Percentages help to get a good comparative feel for the treatment of the disposable

income definition and its measurement for the two groups.
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made on whether the debtor has any funds available, now or in the future,
with which to pay the educational debt.
The policy direction on income for debt payment inherent in student
loan case law had its genesis in the Report of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Law of the United States."3 Published in July 1973, five years
before enactment of § 523(a)(8) of the Code, the findings of the Commission provide the underlying concepts that have been adopted and applied in
cases interpreting the dischargeability provisions. Of particular importance
in the Commission Report, which addresses perceived abuses of the student
loan program, are two phrases:' "undue hardship" and its companion concept,
"minimal standard of living.""
The Code itself incorporates only one of the pertinent phrases, that of
"undue hardship." Under § 523(a) certain debts are excepted from a general
discharge for a variety of policy reasons, 45 but the only true exception to
nondischargeability of student loans under § 523(a)(8)(B) reads: "excepting
such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents." 46 An analysis of the case
law shows that the intent of the provision, as evidenced by the Commission's Report incorporating legislative history,4 7 was to thwart abuse of the
student loan program.48 The Code section does not address this purpose.
Instead, it references the term "undue hardship" only as the measure by
which all student loans are to be judged worthy (or unworthy) of discharge.

43. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 94d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1973) [hereinafter Bankruptcy
Commission Report].
44. Id. at 140-41.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1986). Categories under § 523 disallow debts arising from:
(a)(1) certain taxes or custom duties; (a)(2) fraud regarding financial conditions (includes
purchase of luxury goods 60 days before the entry of the bankruptcy order of relief); (a)(3)
certain unscheduled debts; (a)(4) fraud; (a)(5) alimony and child support; (a)(6) willful and
malicious injury; (a)(7) fines and penalties owing to governments; (a)(8) student loans; (a)(9)
death or injuries arising out of intoxication; (a)(10) previously non-discharged debts; (a)(1 1)
settlements or judgments involving fraud and depository institutions or insured credit unions;
(a)(12) malicious or reckless failure to maintain capital of insured depository institutions;
(a)(13) payments of restitution under Title 18, United States Code; (a)(14) debt incurred to
pay tax under (a)(1); (a)(15) other debts incurred in divorce or separation; (a)(16) certain
membership fees or assessments connected with condominium ownership. Id.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1986) (emphasis added).
47. Bankruptcy Commission Report, supra note 43, at 140-41.
48. Id.
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B. TESTS OF UNDUE HARDSHIP

Faced with a dearth of legislative direction, the courts nearly without
exception have taken the "undue hardship" approach in applying §
523(a)(8)(B). Consequently, there has been a nearly universal, predetermined outcome in applying the statute as plainly written. In their efforts to
give meaning to the Commission Report's terms "undue hardship" and its
companion concept, "minimal standard of living," five different "tests" or
approaches to analysis have emerged. They are the Johnson 9 test, the
Love ° test, the Brunner" test, the Bryant 2 test, and miscellaneous tests
(case-by-case and equitable approaches). Before examining each, it is
helpful to list the criteria for determining "undue hardship" as set out in the
Bankruptcy Commission Report. These criteria are utilized in some manner
in each of the approaches taken by the courts. Paragraph 17 of the Report
states:
In order to determine whether nondischargeability of the debt will
impose an "undue hardship"on the debtor, the rate and amount of
his future resources should be estimated reasonably in terms of
ability to obtain, retain, and continue employment and the rate of
pay that can be expected. Any unearned income or other wealth
which the debtor can be expected to receive should also be taken
into account. The total amount of income, its reliability, and the
periodicity of its receipt should be adequate to maintain the debtor
and his dependents, at a minimal standardof living within their
management capability, as well as to pay the educational debt.53
1. The Johnson Test
The court in In re Johnson' developed a three-part test of undue
hardship which has been used widely by other courts faced with the student
loan dischargeability issues. The "minimal standard of living" language of

49. In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See infra notes 54-72 and
accompanying text.
50. Matter of Love, 28 B.R. 475 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983). See infra notes 73-77 and
accompanying text.
51. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). See
infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
52. In re Bryant, 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
53. Bankruptcy Commission Report, supra note 43, at 140-41 (emphasis added).
54. 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
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the Bankruptcy Commission Report was the focus."
The first part of the test, labeled the "mechanical test," 6 has two
components: the debtor's future financial resources and expenses. Future
financial resources include earned income and other sources of income or
wealth." Under the expense component, Johnson uses a two-step analysis:
the court looks at what are reasonable monthly expenses for the "similarly
situated hypothetical debtor"5 8 and what constitute extraordinary expens59
es.
The mechanical test is summarized by the court in the following
question: "Will the debtor's future financial resources, for the longest
foreseeable period of time allowed for repayment of the loan, be sufficient
to support the debtor and his dependent at a subsistence or poverty standard
of living, as well'as to fund repayment of the student loan?" 6° If the
answer is yes, then the debt will not be discharged. 6' If the answer is no,
meaning the mechanical test has been satisfied, then analysis continues with
part two of the Johnson test, the good faith test. 62 Here the court is
looking at whether the debtor made a sincere effort to repay the debt. Three
factors are considered: efforts to get a job paying the highest rate possible
given the debtor's skills and education, maximization of financial resources,
and minimization of expenditures.63 The court often references other
Bankruptcy Commission Report language, noting that "'in some circumstances the debtor, because of factors beyond his reasonable control, may
be unable to earn an income adequate both to meet the living costs of
himself and his dependents and to make the educational debt payments. ""
55. Id. at 536.
56. Id. at 539.
57. Id. at 537-39. Under earned income are the following considerations: the debtor's
rate of pay, wages and/or salaries earned, gender, ability to obtain and retain employment,
current employment status, employment record, skills and education, health, access to
transportation, and small dependent children. Other sources of income or wealth include, for
example, unemployment compensation, welfare, and child support.
58. Id. at 538 (quoting Alan M. Ahart, DischargingStudent Loans in Bankruptcy, 52
AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 207 (Summer 1978)). Monthly expenses could include geographical
variations in cost of living, marital status, number of dependents, and whether necessities are
furnished in kind. Id.
59. Id. The second factor relates to extraordinary expenses defined as "nondiscretionary payments which require a debtor to expend more each month than the minimal
cost of necessities," such as, medical expenses. Id.
60. Id. at 544.
61. 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 523, 543.
62. Id. at 542-43.
63. Id. at 541.
64. Id. at 540 (quoting Bankruptcy Commission Report, pt. II, at 140 n.16).
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The Johnson court asks two questions under the good faith test: "Was
the debtor negligent or irresponsible in his efforts to minimize expenses,
maximize resources, or secure employment?" and "if 'yes,' would lack of
such negligence or irresponsibility have altered the answer to the mechanical
test?"' If the answer to the first question is "no," then a discharge can be
granted. If the answer to both questions is "yes," then there is a presumption against dischargeability that can only be rebutted by the application of
the third part of the Johnson test, the policy test. 66
The policy test looks at three variables: the student loan debt amount,
the percentage of indebtedness represented by the student loan, and benefits
from the education.6" In formulating its policy position, the Johnson court
looked to perceived abuse of the student loan program by those filing for
bankruptcy, noting the number of students filing bankruptcy and the
intentional nature of the effort to secure an "unjust enrichment" through the
bankruptcy process." In summarizing the policy component of the threepart test, the Johnson decision said the court must ask:
Do the circumstances--i.e., the amount and percentage of total
indebtedness of the student loan and the employment prospects of the
petitioner indicate:
65. Id. at 543.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 5 Bankr. Ct. Rep. 532, 543. The legislative history states: 'The amendment was
adopted in the light of testimony that the bankruptcy rate involving student loans has
increased significantly in the last several years and that in some areas of the country students
are being counseled on filing for bankruptcy to discharge their obligation to repay guaranteed
student loans." H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 13-14 (1976). Accord REPORT
OF THE SENATE COMMrrTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4744; S. REP No. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 32, (1976) reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4744.
The counsel representing the American Council on Education remarked the following
in Bankruptcy Revision hearings:
Barring educational debts from discharge during the in-school period and
the first five years of repayment will erect a necessary barrier to graduates
and dropouts who deliberately seek to dissolve their repayment obligations
at a time when their assets are at a minimum.
The option of discharge within five years where the debtor can demonstrate
"undue hardship" . . . will enable referees to distinguish between individuals who have contrived to secure an unjust enrichment through the
operation of the bankruptcy law and those who have realistically fallen on
hard times and who deserve the benefits of the general "fresh start" policy
of the Act.
Id. at 543 (quoting Bankruptcy Revision Hearings, Pt. 2, at 1095).
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(a) That the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy
petition was to discharge the student debt, or
(b) That the debtor has definitely benefitted financially
from the education which the loan helped to
finance. 69
A negative answer to both parts of the question would result in discharge of
the particular debt while an affirmative response to either part would render
the debt nondischargeable.7 °
Under the Code, if the petition is filed within seven years after the first
payment became due, then the discharge of the student loan can be granted
only if there is a showing of "undue hardship."'' The Johnson test permits
student loan debts to be discharged in this prohibited period only if undue
hardship can be found under the mechanical test and if the debtor passes
both the good faith test and the policy test.72
The detail evident in the Johnson test underscores the intense scrutiny
courts give to the financial condition of student loan debtors, an often
unforgiving accounting that requires these debtors to live spartan lifestyles
not required of other debtors such as family farmers. This is generally true
regardless of which tests or approaches are taken by the courts.
2. The Love Test
In Matter of Love, 3 the court modified the Johnson test by amending
the policy test. To the first part of the Johnson policy test concerning the
dominant purpose of the bankruptcy filing were added two variables: a
consideration of the "length of time which has elapsed between the
graduation or departure of the debtor from the program of instruction and
the filing of the Bankruptcy" and the "amount of money paid by the debtor
on the obligation prior to the Bankruptcy having been filed."74
The student abuse generating the strong congressional response to the
dischargeability of student loans is viewed in this decision as requiring more

69. Id. at 544.
70. Id.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) (1988). Such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend
overpayment first became due before five years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of
the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition. Id. This section was
amended in 1990 to extend the period from five years to seven years. 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8)(A) (1994).
72. In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 523, 539-44 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
73. 28 B.R. 475 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983).
74. Id. at 478.
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than what it deems a "mechanical" and "unfair" approach of "'slip once and
you lose.' 5 The addition of the two conditions to the policy test was
designed to alleviate the abusive situation where a student immediately
attempts to discharge educational debts. 76 The Love court stated that "the
further one gets away from that scenario, the weaker 7the policy interest in
making this type of debt nondischargeable becomes.
3. The Brunner Test
The Brunner test offers the only circuit court criteria for determining
"undue hardship." The Second Circuit ruling in Brunner v. New York State
Higher Education Services78 adopted the following three-part standard:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a "minimal standard of living" for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to
repay the loans.79
The standard, developed by the district court and adopted by the Second
Circuit, was based on legislative history and other court decisions." The
Second Circuit noted, in justifying part two of the Brunner test, that the
statute itself exhibits the congressional intent that discharge of student loans
should be "more difficult than that of other nonexcepted debt."'"
4. The Bryant Test
A two-part test for undue hardship was adopted by the court in the
1987 case of In re Bryant:82
"[U]ndue hardship" exists (1) [w]here the debtor has net income
which is not substantially greater than federal poverty guidelines,
because a debtor so living perforce is unable to maintain a

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 396.
Id.

81. Id.

82. 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
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minimal standard of living and make payments on student loans;
or (2) [w]here the debtor has income substantially above the aforesaid poverty guidelines, but there is a presence of "unique" or
"extraordinary" circumstances which render it unlikely that the
83
debtor will be able to repay his or her student loan obligations.
The court, in trying to formulate a more objective test, generally criticized
the Johnson test for being "unfortunately complicated" and rejected the
portion of the policy test which concerned the amount and percentage of
debt represented by the student loan, noting that this information lacked any
"significance" and was "irrelevant." The Bryant court considered that its
test satisfied the purpose of § 523(a)(8)(B) 5 in that the test addressed the
concerns set forth in the Bankruptcy Commission Report. 6
5. Miscellaneous Tests: Case-by-Case and Equitable Approaches
Many of the reported decisions reviewed chose not to follow any one
test but looked instead to the particular facts of the cases before the court
in order to determine what constituted "undue hardship" and "minimal
standard of living." Some courts relied on the equitable nature of decisionmaking available to bankruptcy courts for guidance in interpreting the statute
and in understanding its legislative history. Both of these analytical
approaches will be illustrated in case law under sections which are to follow.
C. DISPOSITION OF STUDENT LOAN CASES

Educational debts typically have been found either to be totally
nondischargeable or entirely forgiven, but in some instances courts have
drawn on their equitable powers to grant partial relief to student loan
debtors. The following cases describe the several approaches used by courts
under § 523(a)(8). 7
1. Circuit Court Decisions
The circuit courts have offered little guidance in construing § 523(a)(8).
The only "test" to evolve arose out of a Second Circuit decision, Brunner
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 914.
Id. at 915 n.2.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1988).
Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915.

87. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

v. New York State Higher Education Services.8 The debtor had to show
that repayment of the student loan would result in a minimal standard of
living, that additional circumstances during the repayment period would not
alleviate the debtor's financial plight, and that a good faith effort to repay
was made. 9 Noting that there was "very little appellate authority on the
definition of 'undue hardship,"' the Brunner court cited the Bryant case but
did not adopt the Bryant test.'
The Second Circuit did interpret congressional intent in § 523(a)(8) as
mandating greater difficulty for the discharge of student loans than for other
nonexcepted debt.9 Brunner did not establish her eligibility under the
"undue hardship" exception; there were no extenuating circumstances to
hamper her future ability to meet her student loan obligations (e.g., no
dependents, no health problems), and she did not show good faith (only ten
months had elapsed since she received her master's degree, she had made
no payments on the loan, and she had not requested a deferment).92 The
Second Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the bankruptcy court
had erred in discharging her student loans on the basis of "undue hardship." 93
Two recent appellate court decisions, both from the Sixth Circuit,
emphasized the abuse issue when evaluating the student loan discharge
exception provision. In In re Merchant,94 the Sixth Circuit noted that
student loans, unlike commercial transactions, are unsecured and made with
no reliance on a debtor's income, credit rating, or collateral.9 5 They are
awarded rather on a belief that the loans will be repaid by students with
"sufficient income to service the debt following graduation." 96 The court
stated, "The legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) teaches us that the
exclusion of educational loans from the discharge provisions was designed
to remedy an abuse by students who, immediately upon graduation, filed
petition for bankruptcy and obtained a discharge of their educational
loans, 9 7 thereby undermining the good faith repayment scheme. The
court, in resolving the issues before it, did not examine the merits of the
bankruptcy court's determination that the student loan was dischargeable.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 396-97.
Id. at 396.
958 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id.
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In In re Cheesman,98 the court affirmed the discharge of student loans;
there was, however, a strong dissenting opinion issued. 99 The issues of
good faith and abuse were paramount in both the majority and minority
positions. The Cheesmans had $30,000 in outstanding debts, of which
$14,267 was student loan debt."° Margaret Cheesman received a degree
in English, and Dallas Cheesman, who already had a science degree, pursued
studies in educational psychology.' ' Margaret Cheesman worked sporadically as a part-time teacher's aide, receiving a gross monthly salary of
$651."2 After returning from maternity leave, she learned her position
She qualified for unemployment compensation,
had been filled.0
continued to seek work but remained unemployed at the time of the hearing." Dallas Cheesman worked as director of an alternative school, then
was a family worker in a residential program for disturbed children, and at
the time the petition was filed, he was working as an early intervention
specialist, making a gross salary of $1123 a month. He also worked parttime making $200 a month. Their only extravagant expense was $100 a
month for private school tuition which was paid primarily by relatives.0 5
The court listed the three elements of the Brunner test, noted that the
bankruptcy court had not indicated which test it had used in determining
"undue hardship," and then stated that the Cheesman loans would be
dischargeable "under any undue hardship test the court may have used in
reaching its decision."' 6
The Sixth Circuit, in finding "undue hardship," seemed to apply the
Brunner criteria to the instant facts noting (1) that the Cheesman's 1992
gross income of $15,676 only slightly exceeded the 1992 federal poverty
income guideline of $13,950 for a family of four. With a monthly deficit
of $400 and a "frugal lifestyle," they could not maintain a "minimal standard
of living" if required to repay the student loan; (2) there was no indication
in the foreseeable future that their financial circumstances would improve
(she made only minimal wages when working and her unemployment
compensation was about to run out); and (3) there was no evidence of bad
faith.'0 7 Both husband and wife had made two payments each on their
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

25 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cheesman, 25 F.3d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 359-60.
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respective loans.'08 The court saw no evidence "that they were attempting
to abuse the student loan system by having their loans forgiven before
' °9
embarking on lucrative careers in the private sector."
The dissent strongly opposed discharging the debt, stating that the
debtors had not met their burdens of overcoming the presumption inherent
in § 523(a)(8)(B)" 0 that student loans are nondischargeable in bankruptcy."'
Specifically, the dissent disagreed with the majority findings
regarding the second and third factors. It found no circumstances indicating
that the Cheesmans would be unable to improve their financial situation." 2
They were not elderly, ill, or disabled. They were both college-trained. He
was hoping for a promotion while she was qualified to tutor or substitute
teach. The dissent also did not consider four payments made as sufficient
to demonstrate good faith." 3 Additionally, the debtors had made no
efforts to defer their payments prior to attempting to discharge them." 4
The dissent in Cheesman relied upon the reasoning in In re
Roberson,115 a 1993 Seventh Circuit case. 1 6 Emphasizing the importance of stringent requirements for discharge of a student loan obligation,
the Roberson court adopted the Brunner test when reversing the district
court holding and reinstating the bankruptcy court ruling." 7 Both lower
court decisions had applied the Johnson test.1 8 In Roberson, the debtor
had borrowed $9702 to finance associate and bachelor of science degrees." 9 After graduation, he continued with the job he had while in
school (earning $33,000 a year as an automobile assembler) because he was
unable to find a higher-paying job based on his industrial technology
education.120 Four years after graduation a string of personal problems
(loss of drivers license due to driving under the influence, layoff from his
plant, divorce, and loss of house and automobile to his ex-wife) caused his
life "to fall apart."''
With no steady employment his income dropped to

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 358.
25 F.3d at 360.
11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)(B) (1988).
25 F.3d at 363 (Guy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.
999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993).
25 F.3d at 363 (Guy, J., dissenting).
999 F.2d at 1135.
Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1133-34.
999 F.2d at 1134.
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$6000 a year.'22 Unable to pay his creditors, he filed a Chapter 7 petition,
He sought dislisting $18,357 in assets and over $34,000 in debts."
2
charge of his student loans." The bankruptcy court, rather than discharging the educational obligations, ordered a two-year deferment in order for
him to recover financially." The district court reversed and granted discharge of the student loans."
The Seventh Circuit, while noting the scarcity of appellate precedent
for interpreting the term "undue hardship," found support for a "heightened
standard for dischargeability of student loans" in the Bankruptcy Commission Report and the Brunner test. 27 The court delved into the philosophy
behind the student loan program. It emphasized the different character of
student loans versus conventional loans, characterizing the loan as a
"mortgage on the debtor's future."'128 Interestingly, after emphasizing that
debt repayment is dependent on "increased income" from the loan-financed
education, the appellate court emphatically rejected the policy portion of the
Johnson test which considers whether the debtor has benefitted from his
education. 2 9
At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, the appellate court found
that Roberson's debts did overwhelm his assets, that at the time he was
spending $40 a month to rent a one-room apartment with no kitchen and no
toilet, and that over one-half of his assets represented a nonliquid interest in
the house possessed by his former spouse. 3 ' Even conceding such dire
financial conditions (including unemployment due to wrist and back injuries
and no transportation arising from drunk driving charges), the court did not
believe that Roberson's future prospects were equally dim."' Since his
future prospects were brighter, "undue hardship" was not found. 32 The
court also commented on the connection between his unemployment and

122. Id.
123. Id. at 1134.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1134-35.
128. Id. at 1135, 1136 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977),
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963). Specifically, the court noted that student loans are
"made without business considerations, without security, without cosigners," and especially
with repayment dependent on "the debtor's future increased income resulting from the
education." Id.

129. Id.

130. Id. at 1137.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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transportation problems which stemmed from drunk driving charges, but
chose not to rule at that time on the question of good faith (whether
hardship was self-imposed due to factors beyond control of the debtor).113
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, remanded for entry of a
judgment reinstating the two-year deferment period, and left the door open
for possible discharge at the end of the two-year deferment period if the
debtor's financial circumstances did not improve. 34
The Third Circuit did address policy issues underlying § 523(a)(8)
when deciding whether a co-signer on an educational loan was subject to the
discharge exception provisions in the 1993 decision, In re Pelkowski1 35
The appellant acted as a surety for her son and daughter On six student loans
totalling nearly $11,000 plus interest. a6 In considering Pelkowski's argument that the bankruptcy statute applied only to the primary debtors, her
children, the circuit court looked to legislative history for guidance. 7
The court delved deeper than a perusal of authority regarding interpretation
of the term "individual debtor" by studying the overall purpose of the entire
section.1 38 Here the circuit court referred to legislative history which had
addressed the "perceived rise in bankruptcy filings by students on the brink
of lucrative careers.' 39 The court agreed with the Sixth Circuit position
in In re Merchant that § 523(a)(8) was enacted to "prevent abuses in and
protect the solvency of the educational loan programs." 0
While admitting that provisions which limit discharge must be narrowly
construed in favor of the debtor, the Third Circuit emphasized that the clear
intent to restrict discharge in student loan cases mandated by Congress must
not be construed more narrowly than what "the language and legislative
history allow."' 4 ' The court held that the statute applied to the co-signer
14
and that her debts were nondischargeable. 1
The Eighth Circuit, in two decisions, had earlier also addressed aspects
of student loan dischargeability. In In re Andrews, 143 the Eighth Circuit
133. Id. at i137-38.

134. Id. The court commented on the connection between Roberson's unemployment
and transportation problems, but chose not to rule at that time on the question of good faith
(whether hardship was self-imposed or due to factors beyond the control of the debtor). Id.
135. 990 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1993).
136. Id. at 738-39.
137. Id. at 740-41.
138. Id. at 742.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 743.
141. Id. at 744-45.
142. Id.
143. 661 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1981).
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remanded the matter to the Bankruptcy Court to determine facts concerning
the debtor's reasonable expenses and estimated income. Gladys Marie
Andrews owed $2500 for vocational nurses training. No payments had been
Determining that there was insufficient evidence to
made on the loan.'
make a determination as to "undue hardship," the court took notice of the
"minimal standard of living" language from the Bankruptcy Commission
Report which was set out in a quotation from In re Wegfehrt. 45 The
Andrews court did conclude that the lower court properly took into consideration the debtor's illness (cancer) in determining undue hardship."4
The second Eighth Circuit decision, Education Assistance Corp. v.
Zellner,147 dealt with the question of disposable income rather than undue
hardship. A Chapter 13 case, the Zellner court reduced the debtor's student
loan obligation to $7404, approximately eighty-one percent of the allowed
claim of $9,176 under the wage earner plan. 4
The creditor objected
under the "best interests of creditors" test and also argued lack of good faith
regarding payment of disposable income. 49 Germane to this discussion
were the court's observations regarding good faith: "The bankruptcy court
must look at factors such as whether the debtor has stated his debts and
expenses accurately; whether he has made any fraudulent misrepresentation
to mislead the bankruptcy court; or whether he has unfairly manipulated the
Bankruptcy Code.'
The Zellner court emphasized that the creditor had the burden of
proving that the debtor had not applied all of his disposable income to the
plan payments.' 5 ' The Circuit Court was also satisfied with the Bankruptcy Court's finding that the debtor's medical condition constituted special
circumstances.' 52 The possibility of future raises or tax refunds was found
to be "speculative" on the part of the creditor. 5 3 The difference in
approach under an old Chapter 13 student loan case (petition filed prior to
the 1990 amendment which makes student loans nondischargeable under
Chapter 13 as well as Chapter 7) shows a much more lenient attitude toward
student loan debtors, with more burden placed on creditors to show cause
144. Id. at 703.
145. Id. at 704 (citing 10 B.R. 826, 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (determining "undue
hardship" based on the facts and circumstances of each case)).
146. Id. at 704-05.
147. 827 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987).
148. Id. at 1224.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1227.
151. Id. at 1226.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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why the educational obligation cannot be met.
2. Nondischarge Decisions
A survey of the case law concerning student loan debt clearly shows
that the most frequent outcome of such litigation is to except such debts
from the discharge of student debtors (and co-signers). It is largely because
"undue hardship" is the only yardstick available in the statute by which a
debtor can be measured that courts are frequently, if sometimes reluctantly,
forced to except student loan debts from discharge.
The Johnson" test, the earliest test formulated to interpret the
student loan provisions of the Code, was applied by the court in In re
Koch.' 5 If all factual patterns involving student loan dischargeability
were as clear cut as those in Koch, it would not be difficult to apply the
statute, both as it is written and as it was intended to be interpreted to meet
the perceived abuses of the student loan program. Unfortunately, most cases
do not offer such simple solutions. In Koch, the debtor borrowed
$47,654.46 to help finance his dental education.5 6 He also owed the
government the sum of $59,730.27 in health education grants which are
governed by different dischargeability rules. 57 He never completed his
dental education and later found employment as an environmental health
specialist after working as a dental assistant. 58 Koch failed the mechanical test, the court concluding that not enough effort had been made on the
part of the husband and wife to increase income and to eliminate unnecessary expenses.' 59 In describing "undue hardship" the court said that "one
must160be suffering from truly severe, and even uniquely difficult circumstanc-

es. 1,

154. In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
155. 144 B.R. 959, 963 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
156. Id. at 961.
157. Id. Educational loans under the Health Education Assistance Loan Program
(HEAL) (42 U.S.C. § 294 (1988)) are governed by different bankruptcy dischargeability
provisions than other student loans. See Darrell Dunham & Ronald A. Buch, Educational
Debts Under the Bankruptcy Code, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 686-87.
158. 144 B.R. 959, 961 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
159. Id. at 964.

160. Id. at 963.
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The good faith and policy aspects of the Koch case are of particular
significance. The court found that the debtor's education was cut short
because he was caught stealing from the university book store,16' that his
motivation for filing was questionable, 162 that he had indeed benefitted
from his education,' 63 and that the record showed he had made no payments on his educational loans. Regarding the latter, the court sternly noted
that this "debtor wishes to benefit from the public largess and thereafter
lighten his debt load. This debt is not an undue hardship in the legal sense,
but in fact is a substantial inconvenience to debtor's lifestyle."'164 The
Koch court also emphasized the philosophy behind student loans of making
monies available to individuals who would not otherwise be able to attend
college, and opined that "[i]t would indeed be tragic if another worthy
candidate were unable to obtain the funds necessary for an' 65education
because education loans were easily discharged in bankruptcy."'
An earlier case, In re Courtney,'66 applied the mechanical and good
faith parts of the Johnson test but rejected the policy portion. Courtney also
rejected the Bryant court's use of poverty guidelines. 67 The court argued
against the policy test as "going too far" and 6as "employ[ing] an almost
Draconian test going beyond undue hardship."'
Courtney had attended a vocational school, incurring the $2500 student
loan obligation which was the subject of the litigation. His total unsecured
scheduled debt of $359,774.81 included claims of $300,000 arising out of
an automobile accident.' 69 No payments had been made on the student
loan. 70 The court discussed what constituted "reasonable expenses," a
term frequently found in discussions of "disposable income" in other
chapters under the Code, but rarely used in student loan cases.' 7' Relying
on a definition found in another case, the court defined "reasonable
plus extraordinary expensexpenses" as "minimal nondiscretionary expenses
72
debtor.'
the
of
needs
special
by
es, justified

161. Id. at 961.
162. Id. at 964.
163. Id. at 966.

164. Id.
165. Id.

166. 79 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.at 1012-13.
Id.at 1013.
Id.at 1006.
Id.
79 B.R. at 1008.

172. Id. (citing In re Brown. 18 B.R. 219 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982)).
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Courtney's income, ranging from $10,000 in 1983 to $21,600 in 1986,
included unemployment compensation in the amount of $3500)1 3 The
debtor had worked for nine years as a janitor and flue cleaner for Inland
Steel. He was without a high school diploma, and suffered from an eye
injury not covered by insurance. His wife, who had epilepsy, was also not
covered entirely by insurance. The debtor's dependents also included three
74
children, ages nine, ten, and twelve.
The Courtney's monthly expenses exceeded $1395.'
His original
petition had listed only $894 in monthly expenses with monthly take home
pay of $1200.176 The court concluded that a "simple economic, ability-topay in the future test" was the appropriate standard to be applied.' 77 The
court went on to say that it "does not relish being placed in a position of
being an arbiter of a Debtor's ... behavior patterns or life style, by doing
a line-item review of income, expenses and available unencumbered
assets.' 178 Whether reluctant or not, the court concluded that the expenses
had been seemingly unnecessarily increased, were excessive (housing
increased from $119 to $300, clothing from $25 to $175 and transportation
from $25 to $150), and that the debtor's prospective income was sufficient
79
to satisfy the student loan obligation without "undue hardship.'
Concluding that "[t]here is no universally accepted, tried-and-true test
that unerringly renders a finding of 'undue hardship,"' the court in Matter
of Coleman18 looked at numerous court decisions before finding the debt
nondischargeable.' 8 The court characterized the methods of determining

173. Id. at 1005.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1005-06. The debtor's monthly expenses included: food--S400; mortgage
payment--$300 plus insurance and taxes; car payment--none, but $100 for gas and oil and
$50 for maintenance of a 1974 Plymouth Duster and 1971 Chevrolet truck; clothes--$175;
children's school expenses--S50; utilities--$150; phone--$45; union dues--$25; repayment of
$2500 down payment on purchase of house--$ 100 (owed to father-in-law), and church--$150.
The court noted that the debtor's original petition reflected smaller sums for clothing and
transportation and that the debtor had purchased a new residence shortly before trial. The
Courtneys had sold their mobile home for $500 and replaced its monthly payment of $119
with a $300 payment for the new house. The proceeds from the mobile home sale were used
to buy a washer and dryer. Id.
176. Id. at 106.
177. Id. at 1013.
178. Id. at 1015.
179. id. at 1015-16.
180. 98 B.R. 443 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989).
181. Id. at 448-49. The factors considered by the court included: extenuating or unique
circumstances, good faith efforts regarding payment deferment or forbearance, self-imposed
hardships, long-term hardship, income relative to poverty guidelines, payments made,
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"undue hardship" as often falling under one of two approaches: the liberal
one that tries to strike a balance between fresh start and abuse of student
loan policy and "the hard-line stand" which sees a debtor "having to be
stripped of 'all that makes life worth living"' before a discharge will be
granted.82 The equitable approach according to the Coleman court was
to utilize a case-by-case analysis, taking into consideration the "totality of
83
circumstances.",
Coleman owed $4569 in student loans, this debt representing twenty-six
per cent of his total indebtedness.'8 No payments had been made on the
loan. A high school graduate, married with five children (including one
adult child with cerebral palsy), he incurred the educational debt for driving
school. Trained as a semi-truck driver, he quit school because he was
scared and did not like being away from home. He had held a variety of
jobs, including welder and maintenance worker. His wife was a part-time
cook, and his children got free school lunches and books.'8 5
The net monthly income of Coleman and his spouse was $1450, with
current actual expenses totalling $1279. The court deducted the estimated
monthly medical insurance costs of $123.41 from the debtor's excess of
$171, leaving $47.59 available for the student loan debt. 8 6 While the
court did not use the terms "good faith" and "policy," the decision reflects
that both were taken into consideration. No payments were made, and no
forbearance or deferral was requested. The debtor benefitted from his training and chose to leave his employment. While sympathizing with the
"plight" of the debtor, noting that the family had "persevered through great
adversity," the court nevertheless concluded that the debtor could "rise above
his misfortune" and pay the debt with the "excess income" of $47.59 a
month.' 7
The Bryant88 court combined the cases of three Chapter 7 debtors-Lewis Bryant, Mary Gamble, and Paul Pine. In this decision, the court
formulated a new test based on poverty income guidelines, resulted in
financial resources, disability, reasonable living expenses, dependent responsibilities, medical

expenses, usefulness of education, employment history, timing of petition, maximization of
income, minimization of expenses, present or future ability to repay, dominant purpose of
bankruptcy, excess income, and ratio of student loan to entire debt. Id.
182. Id. at 449.

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 451.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 451.

187. Id. at 454-55.

188. 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying
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discharges of student loans for two debtors, Gamble and Bryant, and
nondischargeability for Pine. 9 The Bryant court critiqued the Johnson
test as being too complicated and rejected outright the policy portion as
being entirely irrelevant." 9 In looking at the congressional intent of the
statute regarding abuse by "individuals with superior education and
employment skills," the court noted that "[ilt is quite apparent that such
'abuses' are not unchecked by allowing discharges to persons whose income
is at or below the poverty guidelines."' 9'1
Gamble, whose educational debt totalled $3000, had to quit executive
secretarial training due to financial difficulties.' 9 She worked part-time,
did not drive, and earned net income of only $240 a month while expenses
totalled $250 a month. Her income was only half that of the poverty
income guidelines, and her job prospects were poor. The court, in discharging the student loan, found that she had maximized her "scarce"
resources, and that while she was "industrious and optimistic," her condition
could be described as "hopeless."'' 93 "In fact," the court concluded, "so
grim is her situation that those of Pine and even Bryant pale in compari-

son." 194

Bryant, whose educational pursuits were quite different from Gamble's,
also received a discharge of a student loan for $11,000 plus interest. 95
After graduating from law school, he failed the bar examination five times
and was working primarily as a substitute teacher, earning net income of
between $173 and $183 every two weeks. With income at or slightly above
poverty guidelines, the court applied the second prong of the Bryant test,
that of "unique" and "extraordinary" circumstances to the facts.'" The
debtor had annual medical expenses of almost $200 due to diabetes, plus
additional orthodontist bills. The court found that "Bryant's prospects for
passing the bar examination and being an attorney is thinking almost as
wishful as hypothesizing the 97prospect that the Debtor Mary Gamble will
become the owner of a car."'1
Pine, who owed $2863 for training at a beauty college, worked as a
hairdresser for over a year but left because of low income. 98 As an assis189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 919-26.
Id. at 915 n.2.
Id. at 916-17.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 921.
Id.
72 B.R. 913, 925.
Id.

197. Id.

198. Id. at 921-22.
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tant manager of a clothing store, he had a net income of $141 per week. He
lived with his father who was interested in moving into a retirement home.
His yearly net income of $7332 exceeded the poverty level of $5500 for a
single person. 199 He had excess monthly income of $10 after paying $594
in expenses. Because his income exceeded poverty guidelines, the court
looked at "unique" and "extraordinary" circumstances and found none. 200
The creditor holding his student loan was willing to accept $30 a month.
The court noted that Pine would be able to comply once the telephone
arrearages (of $100 a month) were paid in full. The court excepted the debt
from discharge. 2 °'
3. Discharge Decisions
The earliest significant case granting a discharge for "undue hardship"
was In re Johnson,202 the case which developed the three-part mechanical,
good faith, and policy test for undue hardship, 2 3 which has been followed
and modified by numerous courts. Deborah Lee Johnson, the debtor, owed
$1500 for two student loans when she quit after one semester at a community college. 2° She had made no payments. In applying the mechanical
test, the court focused on her probable rate of pay if employed and her
ability to obtain and retain employment. 2' Noting that her employment
prospects were "grim," the court found that the debtor was "unemployed,
unskilled, uneducated, crippled by a painful injury of uncertain duration, and
pregnant. '2°6 Looking at her expenses, the second prong of the mechanical test, the court said that her income was at the poverty level (she was
receiving public assistance) and that she was only "able to afford the basic
necessities. 207 The court stated that "[a] welfare award, by definition, is
'208
only enough to sustain a person at a poverty-level standard of living.
Interestingly, this sentiment by the Johnson court in 1979 would form the

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 922-23. The debtor had the following monthly expenditures: rent--$190;
public transportation--$77; food--$150; clothing--$50; laundry--$4; life insurance--$10.25; and
current phone--$13 (arrearage--$100 monthly, total owed $465). Id. at 922.
202. 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
203. Id. at 536-44.
204. Id. at 532.
205. Id. at 539-40.
206. Id. at 540.
207. Id. at 539-40.

208. Id. at 540.
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basis of the Bryant2°9 test in that same Eastern District Bankruptcy Court
in Pennsylvania in 1987.
With regard to the good faith test, as applied to the facts in the Johnson
decision, the court said that whether payments had been made was relevant
but not persuasive.1 Also, the court noted that the debtor's decision to
move out of her parents' home was their idea, not hers, and therefore not
evidence of a failure to minimize expenditures. 21' The creditor argued that
she had not sought either rehabilitation or vocational training for her
disability, but her argument that the disability might not be permanent
seemed to satisfy the court.21 2 The court concluded that the debtor was
partially responsible for her unfortunate circumstances but not to a degree
to demonstrate bad faith.21 3
Ms. Johnson also passed the policy test.2" 4 Her small student debt
comprised less than thirty percent of her total indebtedness so it was not her
predominant reason for filing bankruptcy." 5 Also, her education did not
contribute to her earning capacity. The need to devise a more meaningful
statutory provision to distinguish those debtors who abuse the student loan
program from those who do not is supported by the Johnson court's strong
conclusion: "It is clear to this court that the debtor in the case at bar is not
a member of the class of debtors whose 216discharge from student loan
obligations § 439A was meant to preclude.
The abuse issue also arose in In re Wegfehrt.217

The debtor had

made eleven payments on a $2000 student loan which comprised only a
small portion of her total indebtedness of $205,636, the majority of which
represented a judgment against her arising out of an automobile accident.21 8 Monthly living expenses for herself and her three children totalled
$1003 while her income as a practical nurse amounted to only $819.
Divorced, she was not receiving child support due to her ex-husband's
unemployment.21 9
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 544.
Id.

216. Id.
217. 10 B.R. 826 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
218. Id. at 828-29.

219. Id. at 828. The debtor's expenses included: rent--$325; utilities and telephone-$137; food--$216; clothing--S80; transportation--S150; car insurance--$30; medical and
dental--$20; and school, hair cuts, and miscellaneous--$45. Id.
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The Wegfehrt court reviewed the Bankruptcy Commission's findings
as well as legislative history22 regarding the purpose of the student loan
discharge provision and concluded that intentional abuse was the statutory
focus.22 The court also opined that each case should be determined on
its own facts.222 In looking at the debtor's circumstances, the court
determined that Wegfehrt was not guilty of such abuse.223 The debtor
without her nurses training would have needed public assistance. In fact,
even with her nursing position, the court said, she probably could still
qualify for welfare, but rather had chosen to try to support her family. Her
expenses were considered to be reasonable with no excess expenditures such
as "club dues or car payments." Wegfehrt had made payments, and her
primary purpose for taking bankruptcy was not to discharge her student loan
debt.224 She was granted a discharge.
A more recent case, In re Law,2" concerned a debtor who was unable
to complete his course of study because the flight school he was attending
closed after only five months, providing him with the equivalent of two and
a half weeks' training and leaving him with nearly $20,000 in student loan
debts. He had received only enough training to get a private license, not a
marketable skill.226 The court looked at the Johnson and Brunner tests
and chose not to accept any one method for determining "undue hardship., 227 Adopting the "case-by-case" approach, reasoned the court,
allowed that "an appropriate, equitable balance will be struck: concern for
cases involving extreme abuse and concern for the overall fresh start policy
228
associated with bankruptcy relief.

220. Id. at 829-30 (quoting

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS

11 140
n.14 (1973) and H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6094).
221. Id. at 830.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 832.
225. 159 B.R. 287 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993).
226. Id. at 290.
227. Id. at 292.
228. Id. at 292-93.
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I 176-77, Pt.
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The court found that Law had made a good faith effort to repay his
student loan obligation, even after the school had closed. 229 The debtor,
who was unemployed, was living with his parents while he looked for work.
His parents, co-signers on the school loan, also were forced to take
bankruptcy due to financial reverses based on medical causes. 230 Relying
on the Bankruptcy Commission Report, the court declared:
The general rule and its two exceptions were enacted to curb a
specific kind of bankruptcy abuse--abuse by students who finance
higher education and file bankruptcy petitions immediately upon
graduation even though they may have well-paying jobs, few other
debts, and no extenuating circumstances to justify discharging
educational loan debt.23 '
The holding of the court in Law reflects the Bankruptcy Commission's
philosophy. Noting that "the school left him [the debtor]--literally" and that
the requirement of repaying a $20,000 obligation over a twenty-year period
for two and a half weeks of education itself creates an "undue hardship" for
both the debtor and his parents, the court chose discharge in its effort to
"strike an equitable balance" between the conflicting policies of curbing
abuse and providing a fresh start.232
4. Partial Discharge Decisions
Rather than taking an "all or nothing" approach, several courts have
rendered decisions allowing for partial discharge of student loan obligations.
233 the debtor, a single, employed
In the 1978 case, In re MacPherson,
mother with two children, one with a malignant brain tumor, was discharged
of her obligation to pay the interest on her $2000 student loan. 23' MacPherson' s weekly expenses out of weekly take home pay of $220.46 totalled
approximately $206.235
The debtor, faced with the possibility of quitting work because of her
son's illness, had no other source of income. 236 The court noted the

229. Id. at 293.
230. Id. at 290-91.
231. Id. at 291.
232. Id. at 294.
233. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 950 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1978).
234. Id. at 951.
235. Id. at 950-51. The debtor's expenses included: union dues--$3.46; child care-$64.25; recreation--$10; automobile maintenance--$15; rent--$19.60; food and household-$60; insurance (life and auto)--$7.10; utilities--$16.15; and car payment--S10.40. Id.
236. Id. at 950.
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"unsettling picture" that her financial condition (present and future) painted,
and commented that there was not even money allocated for birthday
gifts.
237
discharge.
partial
a
granted
court
the
powers,
equity
Using its
While seeming to be sympathetic with the debtor, the MacPherson
court really offered her little relief from her student loan obligations. A
more meaningful result is found in In re Littell,238 where the debts of the
husband, $3000, and the wife, $3550, were reduced to $330 and $480,
respectively.2 39 Both debtors majored in English and education but were
unable to find teaching jobs after diligent efforts. The husband had taken
various jobs such as a landscape gardener, sanitation cleaner, tutor, and
service station attendant. The wife was employed half-time. Their total
debts of $10,388 were comprised largely of the student loans, although there
was testimony to the effect that the petition was not filed in order to avoid
the educational debts.2 °
The Littell court, in addition to granting a partial discharge, approached
the responsibility for the debtors' default on their educational obligations
from a different perspective. The creditor's role was explored. It was noted
that students with low aptitudes and questionable chances of succeeding
were often encouraged by educational institutions to enroll in courses where
there was little employment opportunity."' The court opined that it was
often more of a benefit to the college to grant the loan than it was to the
student. The court then asked the following question: "Was the student
inveigled into obtaining the loan and taking particular courses in college
when the college authorities should have known that upon graduation from
college the student had little chance of obtaining employment in that
field?" 242 The court also pointed out that frequently colleges make little
effort to collect on loans, assuming that students are unable to pay.243
Disagreeing with the position of some courts, that debtors should not be able
to walk away from student loans "unscathed," the Littell court ordered the
debtors to pay the amount which would be due via reduced installments
between the date of filing the bankruptcy and the end of the five-year
nondischargeable period.2 "
237. Id. at 951.
238. 6 B.R. 85 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1980).
239. Id. at 89.
240. Id. at 86-87.
241. Id. at 88.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 89. One of the wife's. two student loans, a guaranteed loan in the amount
of $750, was fully discharged by the court. The hardship discharge was granted because the
guaranteed loan carried a higher interest rate than the two National Direct Student loans
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Student loan case law clearly interprets the relevant Code sections in
a manner that benefits creditors, oftentimes to the detriment of debtors. The
following section of the paper examines how the Code treats family farmer
debtors and their creditors.
II. CHAPTER 12 CASE LAW ON DISPOSABLE INCOME

Two guarantees ostensibly are provided to unsecured creditors under a
Chapter 12 reorganization plan in return for their being forced to share in
the cost of farm reorganization: (1) creditors are supposed to receive all of
the debtor's disposable income if they object to the confirmation of the
debtor's repayment plan, 245 and (2) the so-called best interest of the
creditorstest provides that the unsecured creditor can object to confirmation
of the family farmer's plan if the disposable income to be paid by the
farmer over the period of the reorganization plan is less than the creditors
would receive under a Chapter 7 liquidation.246
The key to enforcement of both provisions is the definition of
disposable income. The statutory definition reduces to this formula: total
farm income minus personal living expenses of the farmer, necessary
business expenses, and plan payments (other than to unsecured creditors)
equals disposable income payable to unsecured creditors.247
The seeming clarity of this formula for determining disposable income
masks definitional problems in the final determination of disposable income:
(1) Despite the importance of a family farmer's gross income in
deriving disposable income, "gross income" is neither defined in
the Code nor have specific kinds of farmer income includable in
gross income been featured in litigation.
(2) There are no hard and fast rules defining what household living
expenses are reasonable. A review of relevant reported judicial
decisions seem to indicate that what is a reasonable expense for
a farm debtor would, in many instances, be an extravagance for a
student debtor.
(3) The determination of what expenses are necessary to farm
operation is a crucial sub-issue in finding disposable income.
Moreover,, defining farm expenses is as much an issue of timing
as of expenses to be allowed. Much of Chapter 12 litigation

which were only partially discharge. Id.
245. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B).
246. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4).
247. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See also In re Rott, B.R. 163, 166 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988).
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centering around disposable income has addressed whether the
family farmer should be allowed to carry over some of one year's
net income to pay farm expenses in a future year, or to retain
some current income to obviate the need to borrow later, or
simply to provide a "cushion" against future contingencies. 4
The propriety of allowing an income carry-over to pay a future
year's expenses understandably differs among the parties in
interest. Debtors typically urge a long-term view of expenses, i.e.,
a carry-over of income from one year to cover expenses in the
next. Unsecured creditors generally argue that "each years'
income and expenses should be contained to that year, and any
carry-over income would be disposable income."249
To illustrate the kinds of issues (including the "carry-over question")
that must be litigated when defining disposable income for farmers, the
reasoning and decision in In re Wood 250 are especially pertinent. The
trustee found that the farmers had liquidated about $80,000 of stored grain,
and had asked the court to declare the proceeds from the sale to be
disposable income. Upon further investigation by the Chapter 12 trustee, the
grain was found to be subject to a secured loan. In that investigation,
however, the trustee found several hundred thousand dollars in other monies
controlled by the farmers that he (the trustee) then claimed were disposable
income. 2 1 The farmers' position was that there was no disposable income
payable, arguing that funds either were expended for the continued (past)
operation of their farm or were required for future 'business and living
expenses.25 2
The court stated that to determine disposable income, it is necessary to
consider (1) all income received by debtors over the term of the plan after
the confirmation date of the plan, and (2) "all actual expenditures to the date
of the analysis, together with any future proposed expenses that are
reasonably necessary for the continuation of Debtors' farming operation,
which may properly include expenses to be paid after expiration of the plan
term." 2 3 This unusual ruling extended the farm "operation" period into
an indefinite future.
Critical to the definition of expenses, and therefore to the ultimate goal
of defining disposable income, is the deductibility of capital expenditures,
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

In re Rott, 94 Bankr. 163, 166 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988).
In re Coffman, 90 Bankr. 878, 882 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988).
122 B.R. 107 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990).
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 115.
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and whether the debtor should be required to obtain operating credit or use
available cash on hand to continue the farm business. Citing the "austerity
of their operation," the Wood court could not find any expenditures that
could not be classified as "reasonably necessary," i.e., the capital expenditures were reasonable.2" Even after the payment of secured debts and the
operating and capital needs of the farm were met, the debtors would have
a surplus of from $80,000 to $105,000, the court predicted that "such
financial conditions will not be achieved" the following year or in the
foreseeable future.25 5 In short, the court found that no disposable income
had been realized as of the date of the hearing in the matter.256
The Wood court's disregard for the rather sizable amount of potential
disposable income ($80,000 to $105,000) is a rather significant instance of
a bankruptcy court's "forgiveness" of farmer debts. Other illustrative cases
are identified in the two sections that follow. To guide that discussion, a
time distinction is made in the analysis: (A) the early (pre-In re Young) 257
cases where there is no income carry-over permitted to pay expenses in a
following year or years (i.e., only the expenses for that year being
considered are allowed in that year) and (B) the later cases where expense
carry-over is permitted from one year to a following year or years.
A. NO INCOME CARRY-OVER

In In re Borg,21' essentially a "best interest of the creditor" opinion,
the court was seeking to determine whether the disposable income projected
to be payable to unsecured creditors was likely to be more or less than what
those creditors would receive in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.259
The court rejected the debtor's plan which, over five years, would have paid
$28,063 to unsecured creditors, since that amount would have been less than
the amount received under a liquidation. 260 That amount should be
compared with over $100,000 of projected "net income" for the three years
1988-1990 alone. That is, net income was almost twenty-five percent of
projected gross farm income for the three years.26'

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 119.
103 B.R. 1021 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1988).
88 B.R. 288 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988).
Id. at 291.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 290.
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In In re Fleshman,262 the debtor wanted to use disposable income to
retire future obligations to secured creditors instead of retiring the debt to
current unsecured creditors.263 In confirming that debtors are required to
commit all disposable income to unsecured creditors, the court said further
that disposable income had to "be computed after the fact, based on actual
income and expenses incurred" rather than projected it at the beginning of
the plan. 2" In that regard, the debtors had projected living expenses of
$25,000 per year. In 1988, however, actual living expenses were $48,115,
and in 1989 they were $38,614. Those expenses were $36,729 more in
26 5
those two years than projected in the plan at the time of confirmation.
Additionally, the debtors had, since confirmation of the plan, purchased a
new car for $9500, built a cabin costing $10,000 on their farm, and donated
$9500 to charity. Finally, at the time of the hearing, the debtors had cash
in the bank in excess of $62,000.26
The court found that there was disposable income, but ordered only
$38,545 be paid to unsecured creditors.267 The court found this total by
adding some unreported income, excess charitable contributions, and the
values of the new car, the cabin construction, a transfer from the debtor to
his father, and a new tiller for the family garden. 26 It appears the court
was requiring a payment to unsecured creditors equal to "contested" debtor
expenditures and transfers only, a kind of penalty payment, since the court
never mentioned that the bank account of $62,000 should be treated as
disposable income.
In In re Gage,2 9 the trustee found disposable income to be $27,660.
The debtors maintained there was no disposable income, as defined in 11
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). 270 The court found that there was $684,733 total
income. After loan repayments and plan payments, $423,139 was income
available to cover expenses of farm operations, living expenses, and other
payments .21 Especially important to the finding of disposable income
were the debtor's living expenses. The reorganization plan provided for
$21,000 a year living expenses, while the debtor's accountant suggested
$30,000 a year as an appropriate amount. An expert estimated that living
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

123 B.R. 842 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990).
Id. at 843.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 845-46.
159 B.R. 272 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993).
Id. at 278.
Id. at 286.
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expenses should increase two to seven percent a year. The court permitted
a five percent annual increase in living expenses.272
In In re Kuhlman,2 3 the debtors' 1988 and 1989 income and expenses varied substantially from the plan projections. The Chapter 12 trustee,
with the burden of determining the amount of disposable income in 1988
and 1989, had indicated it totaled about $60,000, finding 1988 net income
of $72,807 and 1989 net income of $62,249.274 The debtors contested
these figures, but agreed that, considering all income and expense factors in
75
1988, they should have a cash balance of about $60,000.2
The debtors had expanded their farm operation during the past two or
three years. The court nevertheless held that the trustee and creditors had
not rebutted the contention of debtors that expenses for capital and livestock
($16,027), "pre-paid" expenses ($16,377), and improvements ($9252) were
reasonably necessary for continued operation of the farm.1 6
The court concluded that the "improvements" expenditures were not to
be included in disposable income. Citing inconsistencies in the debtors'
records and an inability of the debtors to account for substantial variations
from the plan, the court ordered another hearing to allow evidence on
income received (i.e., actual income received by the debtors in 1988 of
$335,132, as opposed to plan projections for that year of $251,000).277
Apparently, even a sympathetic court could not accept 1989 farm income
exceeding plan projections by $100,000 and expenses exceeding plan
projections by $80,000 without declaring some of it to be disposable
income.
B. NET INCOME CARRY-OVER

A steady trend toward allowing a carry-over of income, first within the
reorganization plan period and then beyond, has developed in litigation
272. Id. Actual living expenses for this family of four increased dramatically from
1988-91, as follows: 1988--$23,491; 1989--$37,365; 1990--$31,667; and 1991--$43,921. Id.
at 285. The court found disposable income of $27,126 total for the four years, compared to
excess living expenses (over the plan amount) of $52,444. Id. at 286.
The debtors responded in court to the allegation of spending income freely by saying
that they "had more cash and so they spent it." Id. at 285. The debtors also stated regarding
the issue of disposable income, that they had "nothing left over and so every expense must
have been reasonable." Id.
273. 118 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990).
274. Id. at 733-34.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 740.
277. Id.
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under Chapter 12.27 This trend effectively negates or nullifies attempts
of unsecured creditors to receive the disposable income promised under the
Code. Several justifications for carrying over net income have been offered
in bankruptcy and higher courts. The treatment of those justifications in
case law has fashioned the current policy on the definition of disposable
income under Chapter 12.
The first serious probe of the carry-over of net income issue occurred
in In re Young. 279 The debtor had a net operating surplus of about
$20,000 at the end of 1987, which he proposed to use for taxes, living
expenses, and farm operating expenses in 1988.2" °
The trustee argued that the intent underlying Chapter 12 was not to
eliminate the farmer's need to borrow. Instead, some of the surplus should
go to pay unsecured creditors rather than to 1988 operating expenses.28'
The debtor-farmer argued that his current financial condition was due to past
282
borrowing and that taking new loans would limit his ability to operate.
After restating the statutory definition of disposable income as income "not
reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor ...or for
expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of
the debtor's business," the court concluded that forcing the debtor to borrow
would impede the congressional goal of successful debtor reorganization:
"[T]he Court therefore interprets disposable income to mean that part of net
operating income above what is reasonably283necessary to pay the upcoming
year's expenses without obtaining credit.t
The borrowing issue was also addressed in In re Coffinan,28 arguably
the leading decision on allowing the carry-over of net income. Three
considerations concerned the court in its judgment on allowing carry-over:
the reasonableness of farm expenses, the availability of credit to the debtor,
and whether an expansion of the farming operation (by allowing carry-over)
would be compatible with the law.28 5 Without ruling definitively on any
of these questions, the Coffian court left the door open for the debtor to use
278. See In re Kuhlman, 118 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990); In re Bowlby, 113 B.R.
983," 989 (Bankr. S.D. I1. 1990); Farm Credit Bank v. Hurd, 105 B.R. 430 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1989); In re Coffman, 90 B.R. 878 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988); In re Rott, 94 B.R. 163
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1988); In re Young, 103 B.R. 1021 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1988); In re K6nzak,

78 B.R. 990, 993 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987).
279. 103 B.R. 1021 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1988).
280. Id. at 1022.

281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.

284. 90 B.R. 878 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988).

285. Id. at 885-86.
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1987 farm income to fund future operations, thereby allowing the debtor to
avoid paying that portion of net income to unsecured creditors. 286 The
income and expense numbers in Coffinan, pertinent to funding "net income,"
showed 1987 gross income of $88,380, farm operating expenses of $51,304,
Chapter 12 plan payments of $16,219, and household expenses of $10,647,
for a net income of $10,209.28?
None of the $10,209 net income was submitted as payment to
unsecured creditors. 8 In addition, funds were used to redeem the 1987
corn crop from storage, and this corn was re-sold at a profit of from $900
to $1000.289 Coffman also sold 1987 soybeans for $15,000 and stored
5000 bushels of 1987 corn for seed. Additionally, he inherited $7013 in
1987.29
This net income of $10,209 was 11.55% of gross income ($88,380).
The total of all other "non-committed" funds was $42,147, or 47.70% of
gross income. However, the court effectively found, none of this income
was "disposable" because there was no disbursement mandated to unsecured
creditors.29' Clearly, the Coffman court interpreted congressional policy
as favoring this expanded view of "continuation" of farm operations over
protection of unsecured creditors: "The unsecured creditors are not left
without hope for disposable income, but they must do more than show net
income. Net income is simply not the equivalent of disposable in'

come. "292

The Coffinan court concluded: "[D]isposable income is intended to be
income which is in excess of that reasonably required for maintenance and
' 29
continuation of a debtor's farming operation from one year to the next.. 1
This position is very favorable to farm debtors. Student debtors, by
contrast, are expected to pay all of their income except the barest of
expenditures for necessities towards retirement of their educational loans.
After the Coffinan decision established the rule for carry-over of
income within the plan period, the court in In re Bowlby29 took the
carry-over analysis to its next logical level. Bowlby withheld $100,000
from his 1989 crop income for 1990 crop expenses. 295 The question again
286. Id.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 885.
113 B.R. 983 (Bankr. S.D. I11.
1990).
Id. at 986.
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was on allowing the debtor to retain funds from last year's crop proceeds to
prepay next year's expenses and thus to avoid borrowing for the next crop
year. The debtor's intent here, however, was to obviate borrowing after the
expiration of the plan.2
The court found that deductible expenses need not be restricted to those
incurred during the period of the plan. The court's interpretation of
congressional policy on "continuation" supported its conclusion: "It cannot
be seriously contended that Congress intended that a debtor's farming
operation continue during the life of the plan but not beyond the period of
297
the plan."
The problem with these decisions allowing net income to be carried
over for use in the next production year is the threat that they raise to the
very existence of disposable income. Clearly, this position on carry-over is
the extreme interpretation of congressional intent to insure that family
farmers survive at whatever cost to unsecured creditors. The decision in
Coffman (and others based on it) suggests that no disposable income may
arise within the plan period since some use can always be claimed for net
income at some future time if a generous interpretation is given to
"continuation of the business." Under that view of continuation, the
carry-over of payments inside the plan period may be a realistic public
policy option. Farm debtors are "put back on their feet" and unsecured
creditors retain the prospect of receiving some disposable income at the end
of the plan period (i.e., at discharge). Such a prospect is seriously
threatened by Bowiby.
Allowing a carry-over beyond the term of the plan as suggested in the
Bowiby decision raises new questions. For example, does a carry-over of
a prior year's net income encourage expansion of farm operations and the
possibility of an inequitable windfall to the debtor? If those carry-over
funds are reasonably necessary to the long-term survival of the farm, does
the creditor effectively have to provide them by foregoing disposable income
payments totally? Finally, why did Congress design a policy requiring
disposable income to be paid within a limited plan period if the carry-over
of income is indefinitely continuous, i.e., if disposable income is defined so
as to be rarely or never distributed? The Bowiby decision tilts interpretation
of the statute decidedly against the unsecured creditor. The strong mandate
in the statute for disposable income to be paid as a guarantee to unsecured
creditors for bearing some share of farm reorganization cost is ignored in
favor of a policy encouraging "continuation," even if that means possible

296. Id.
297. Id. at 988.
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expansion of the farm operation.
It is on the question of income carry-over that courts have been much
more generous toward farm debtors than they have toward student debtors.
In allowing carry-over, they have enlarged the category of necessary
expenses to be deducted from a farmer's total income. The effect, then, is
to diminish and often eliminate disposable income payable to unsecured
creditors. There is no equivalent definitional adjustment for student debtors.
Why the adjustment is specific to farmers only is found in the justifications
offered and accepted in case law. It is here that the public policy positions
diverge, protecting and helping farmer-debtors while discriminately
punishing and hindering student debtors in their respective quests for fresh
financial starts.
There is no equivalent carry-over of income earned allowed to students
in order to pay expenses in a following period. If living and "operating"
expenses of students included payment for capital improvements and
expenses for next year's activities, or if student obligations to repay loans
were nullified by stringent limitations in defining what income is "disposable" as under Chapter 12, there is a reasonable prospect that legislation
would be forthcoming quickly to correct such "abuses" in the student loan
program.
III. ANALYSIS OF DISPARATE TREATMENT
Amendments to the student loan provisions of the Code were prompted
by perceived abusive practices as described in the Report of the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. 298 That report stated that
the new clause (8) of subsection (a) of § 523 "responds to the rising
evidence of consumer bankruptcies of former students motivated primarily
to avoid payment of educational loan debts. It can be anticipated that the
incidence will continue to increase as greater numbers of higher education
loans become payable." 299
The legislative history shows, however, that there was not universal
agreement on either the extent of the abuse or its appropriate resolution.
Statistics generated by the General Accounting Office in 1976300 showed
a general default rate of eighteen percent on educational loans with only
approximately three to four percent of the defaults discharged in bankruptcy.

298. Bankruptcy Commission Report, supra note 43, at 140.

299. Id.

300. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 132 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6093.
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Thus, only one-half to one-fourth of one percent of all matured educational
loans had been discharged in bankruptcy.30' These figures certainly do not
reflect the alarming concern for abusive filings that would threaten the entire
educational loan program, as suggested by the Code exception to discharge
and the case law construing the statutory provision.
The Bankruptcy Commission Report also notes that existing Code
provisions do not provide a framework for handling student loan dischargeability. The Report is specifically referring to clause (2) of § 523(a) which
deals with obtaining money, property, services, or credit based on false
pretenses, a false representation, actual fraud, false financial statements, or
the purchase of luxury goods, and clause (3) which addresses unscheduled
debt. 302 Both clauses (2) and (3) of § 523(a) deal with culpable behavior
which does not warrant a full discharge under any circumstances. The
Report further notes that neither provision provides for "debts incurred
honestly which the debtor subsequently decides not to pay nor distinguish
between persons scheduling education debts who, under the general 'fresh
start' policy of the proposed Act, should and those who should not be
03
enabled to discharge them.0
In the authors' estimation, the student loan provision as enacted fails
for the same reason. It does not provide a method whereby courts can
decide which debtors "should" and which "should not" be enabled to
discharge student loan obligations. By focusing solely on disposable income
as an indicator of a student's ability, rather than duty, to pay, the Code loses
sight of the underlying purpose of § 523(a)(8)--to stem the abuse of the
student loan program.3° Students who are not abusing the system are
permitted to discharge their student loan debts only if they are living at a
minimal [or lower] standard of living, which in many cases is interpreted to
be at or near the poverty level. Other "honest but unfortunate debtors"30 5
under other provisions are not required to exist at such a substandard living
301. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 133 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6094.
302. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2)-(3) (1988).
303. Bankruptcy Commission Report, supra note 43, at 140.
304. See In re Wegfehrt, 10 B.R. 826, 831 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (holding that the
debtor was "not guilty of the intentional abuse of bankruptcy laws which 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8) was intended to bar .... ")(emphasis added); Elaine K. Zipp, Annotation,
Bankruptcy Discharge of Student Loan on the Ground of Undue Hardship Under Sec.
523(a)(8)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USC Sec. 523(a)(8)(B), 63 A.L.R. FED.
570, 575 (1983) (positing that "Congress' purpose in barring the discharge of student loans
was to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy laws by recent graduates trying to escape their
student loan obligations.")
305. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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level in order to avail themselves of a fresh financial start.
Only at the conclusion of both the Johnson3°6 and Brunner3°7 tests
does the issue of good faith arise. Good faith should be the initial or
threshold consideration in determining the dischargeability of student loans.
The cart is before the horse. If good faith can be (is) demonstrated, there
should be no need to apply a disposable income test more stringent than
existing tests under Chapters 12 and 13 for allocating disposable income to
creditors.
By not looking first at good faith, the automatic requirement applied to
all student loan debtors that all disposable income must go to pay student
loans can have harsh and even counter-productive results. Forcing all
debtors with student loans to live under a near poverty living standard
punishes the honest but unfortunate debtor whose debts happen to include
student loans. Only if bad faith or questionable motives are shown should
the court go to a new "step two" and use the income tests to determine what
standard of living (minimum or other, in the present or in the future) the
debtor is likely to realize after payment of "disposable" income. Otherwise,
these case law interpretations indiscriminately punish honest student debtors
who happen to have fallen on hard times.
According to Collier, "[t]here was considerable opposition to [the]
treating of education loans differently than any other loan debt. 30 8 While
excepting most student loan debts from discharge is arguably contrary to the
concept of a debtor's fresh start, the present treatment of student loan debt
also may violate the second goal of bankruptcy law, equitable treatment of
similarly-situated creditors. Education lenders fare far better than other
unsecured creditors since student loan debtors must meet harsher income
standards than debtors in other categories before discharge is allowed. This
point finds support in cases and commentary that place partial blame for the
default of student loan obligations on creditors (institutions) that encourage
students to borrow and then offer liberal repayment terms. 309 Examining
Bankruptcy Code priority treatment, the court in In re Fox, 310 citing 11
U.S.C. § 507(a), pointed out that "Congress did not choose to prefer the
student loan when identifying the unsecured creditors who should receive

306. In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
307. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).

308. LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1523.18, at 523-159 (15th

ed. 1995).
309. Darrell Dunham & Ronald A. Buch, Educational Debts Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 708 (1992) (citing In re Archie, 7 B.R. 715, 719 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1980) and In re Littell, 6 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1980)).
310. 163 B.R. 975, 978 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1993).
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a priority over other unsecured creditors as they did with farmers, fishermen
and employees."
The messages in the Code regarding rights of unsecured creditors,
especially the status of educational lenders, seem to be mixed. Treatment
of debtors with scheduled unsecured debt certainly is varied, if not
discriminatory. One solution offered in the literature in regard to the student
loan dilemma is to shift the burden from the debtor to the creditor, thereby
making a prima facie case for discharge."' Only upon the filing by the
lender of a complaint to determine dischargeability would the debtor have
to justify discharge of a student loan.3" 2 This approach certainly is
compatible with the argument for bad faith/abuse rather than undue hardship
as the criterion for dischargeability of student loans. Overcoming prima
facie discharge would require both the creditor and debtor to argue the
merits of exception to discharge versus dischargeability based on the
debtor's motives and actions, rather than on whether or not the debtor is
poorer than debtors who qualify for discharge under other provisions or
chapters of the Code.
Those favoring an exception to discharge are supported by the court in
In re Woyame 31 3 which, while not prescribing a poverty level income, did
conclude that the debtor should not be spending excess money on entertainment "while his creditors languish unpaid. 3 1 4 This argument, however,
-is not in conflict with the primafacie approach since the debtor in Woyame
had shown bad faith in his treatment of the educational lender. The
legislative history underlying the Bankruptcy Code also emphasizes that the
"taxpayer should not pick up the tab for any individual who is capable of
paying his own way and who will be able to repay his loan without
substantial hardship. 31 5 Again, this position poses no problem either,
since it presumes both an ability to pay and a lack of financial strain in
meeting the student loan obligation.
The court in In re Silliman31 6 rejected the Johnson policy test which
considers the benefit of education, 3 7 agreeing instead with the Brunner
court by stating that "consideration of this factor is not only improper, but
311. Oliver B. Pollack & David G. Hicks, Student Loans, Chapter13, Classification of
Debt, Unfair Discrimination and the Fresh Start after the Student Loan Default Prevention
Initiative Act of 1990, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1617,1637 (1993).
312. Id. at 1637.
313. 161 B.R. 198 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
314. Id. at 202.
315. NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D, BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C.

§ 523, Legislative History and Comment 497 (1995-96 ed.).
316. 144 B.R. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
317. Id. at 752 (citing In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532, 543-44).
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antithetical to the spirit of the guaranteed student loan program." The court
concluded that the student must "bear the burden of poor educational
choices or underutilization of the education they have received. ' 318 This
position is more difficult to reconcile because it does not acknowledge any
relationship between the education/training received and the financial
condition of the student loan debtor at the time a petition is filed. It does
not excuse a debtor who is in the same (or oftentimes worse) negative financial state after the education/training. If the debtor agreed to pay, then it is
irrelevant if what he agreed to pay for (his "poor educational choices") did
not in any way improve his condition. This situation seems to be true
regardless of whether good faith is evident. "Underutilization of the
education ... received" does go to good faith and abuse."a 9
Several important questions are pertinent, assuming a new "good faith"
test were to be applied. Did the student make (or attempt to make) any
timely payments as scheduled under the contract? How much time passed
between education/training financed by a student loan and the filing of the
bankruptcy petition? What is the relationship between the size of student
debt and other scheduled debts? What percentage of the debtor's total debt
is student loan obligation? Did the debtor make efforts to gain employment
using the education/training received? What has been the usefulness, if any,
of the education/training received to the ability of the student to earn higher
income, achieve promotions, or realize upward job mobility? How does the
financial condition of the debtor prior to and during education/training and
at the time of the commencement of the bankruptcy petition (and between
the end of education/training and the date of filing, if considerable time has
elapsed during this period) compare?
Additional considerations are applicable as tests of good faith. Is the
motivation or objective of the bankruptcy petition the debtor's achievement
of inequitable personal gain at the expense of the creditor? Is the debtor's
purpose to achieve a "head start" rather than a "fresh start"? What is the
attitude on the part of the debtor regarding "beating the system" or "getting
something for nothing"?
Is there evidence of deceptive, dishonest,
manipulative, or misleading accounting or financial practices in other
financial dealings of the debtor? Interestingly, in Chapter 12 cases where
the creditor rarely realizes a penny of disposable income to satisfy unpaid,
unsecured debts, these questions seemingly are never asked of the family
farmer debtor. As evidenced by the Code and the case law, they are always
inherent in student loan litigation.

318. Id.
319. Id.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
After careful consideration of the Code, its legislative history and
judicial interpretation of the pertinent statutory provisions, four recommendations seem appropriate. These suggestions are not mutually exclusive and
do not follow in any particular order, although adoption of one or more may
obviate the need for implementation or application of the others.
A. CODE REVISION

Through appropriate re-drafting or "fine-tuning," the Code should
emphasize the difference between an honest and an abusive student loan
debtor. With nothing more to guide the courts than the present undefined
statutory phrase, "undue hardship," the statute has been generally construed
against student debtors, resulting in decisions which have often been
unnecessarily harsh. Both the Code and the courts have missed the point,
focusing on a test that should be utilized only if there has been abuse of the
system. By forcing each student loan to be tested against a standard of
undue hardship under § 523(a)(8), before its discharge can be considered,
there is an unspoken presumption of abuse.
What is needed is a different criterion by which students may be
judged. The following recommended statutory change (shown in bold)
introduces good faith as the determinative test into clause (8) of § 523(a),
replacing "undue hardship" as the standard.
Section 523 Exceptions to discharge.
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt-(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,
insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made
under any program funded in whole or in part by a
governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an
obligation to repay funds received as an educational
benefit, scholarship or stipend, if
(A) the debtor has failed to exercise good faith in
the procurement or payment of the aforesaid
educational loan and has evidenced an intent to
abuse the student loan program or bankruptcy
system;
(B) provided that if the debtor has evidenced
bad faith or intentionally abused the stu-
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dent loan program or the bankruptcy
system, the obligation will be excepted from
discharge unless excepting such debt from
discharge under this paragraph will impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's
dependents. 3 °
In order to implement this new provision, "good faith/abuse" criteria would
be used initially rather than an "undue hardship" test. Factors listed in the
preceding subsection could be considered by the courts. The court in In re
Bethune, 21 in analyzing the Johnson test, considered the good faith
portion in light of the Code policy of "affording a fresh start to an honest
debtor. 3 22 The same approach is advanced here. The flaw in the Johnson
test, and in most tests and approaches adopted by bankruptcy courts, is the
inclusion of any form of mechanical test as the benchmark of
dischargeability. The mechanical or undue hardship test should only be a
last resort, used only if a debtor fails good faith and abuse tests. This
approach would afford more equitable treatment for the "honest but unfortunate" debtor who happens to have educational obligations listed in the
bankruptcy schedules. It would curtail the discriminatory treatment which
requires this class of debtor to be "poorer" than other similarly-situated
debtors before relief would be granted.

320. The material in bold lettering represents the authors' suggested revisions to the
Code. Section 523(a)(8) is unchanged except for the inclusion of the word "if" and the
deletion of the word "unless." Paragraph (A) as presently enacted is completely eliminated.
It presently reads as follows:
(A) such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became
due more than 7 years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the
repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition;
Section 523(a)(8). The wording in paragraph (B) as presently enacted remains unchanged
but follows the authors' suggested language.
321. 165 B.R. 258 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).
322. Id.
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B. DEFERRAL OF PAYMENT

As an alternate to granting the discharge of student loans, the courts
could require more deferral if the student or farm debtor in good faith is
having trouble repaying during the plan period. For example, for many
students the start of the seven-year repayment period may still be too soon
after the student enters the labor force full time for the student to know what
his/her income is likely to be. The student may still be "nickel and diming"
after exiting school. A "quick file" can still be made while the debtor's
income is low, and discharge may thereby be unjustified. The very fact that
the student required an educational loan is some evidence that the student's
financial circumstances were not and may not be promising for some time.
The court should not accept a student's austere condition as permanent.
Likewise, the short plan period in Chapter 12 cases may account for
many instances of family farmer debtors' inability to pay unsecured
creditors. Extending the payment plan or reaffirming unsecured debts (or
a portion thereof) would better serve the Code's purported intent that
disposable income should be available to unsecured creditors.
The same argument justifying discharge (fresh start) could be used by
the courts to justify deferral. Deferral would eliminate any taint (by either
the student or the farmer debtor) of trying to "beat the system." In
conjunction with increased deferral time, there might be forgiveness of
interest during the deferral but continuation of the obligation to pay the principal (beginning perhaps at a later time and/or over a longer period of time
with smaller payments). Both categories of debtors would benefit from the
breathing space, and the creditors would have some reasonable expectation
of eventual payment. As discussed earlier, some courts have used the equity
power to grant partial discharges in an attempt to avoid the "all or nothing"
approach of either total discharge or complete exception to discharge.
Requiring partial payment recognizes the financial difficulties confronting
the debtor at the time of bankruptcy while protecting the rights of lenders
to reimbursement.
C. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

More effort could be made to avoid bankruptcy by steering distressed
student debtors and family farmers toward appropriate funding and
counseling agencies. Exhaustion of administrative remedies could result in
solutions amenable to both debtors and creditors, thus avoiding the time,
expense, and stigma often associated with bankruptcy. This argument is
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addressed effectively in In re Bethune,32 a a 1994 decision which modified
the good faith portion of the Johnson test to include consideration of
whether the debtor pursued any administrative remedies. The Bethune court
stated: "Debtors facing hardship are eligible for deferment of student loans,
as well as other administrative remedies. In cases such as this, where the
student loan is the majority of the debt, bankruptcy could have been avoided
by simply exploring those administrative remedies. 3 24 Perhaps exhaustion
of remedies could be mandated before any consideration of discharge of
student loan by the courts. Similarly, upon the filing of a Chapter 12
petition, courts could require evidence that the debtor had made a good faith
(although unsuccessful) effort to work with his unsecured lenders before the
court would approve a Chapter 12 plan.
D. RE-EVALUATION OF THE "FRESH START" CONCEPT

Congress should rethink what "fresh start" means for all debtors
entering bankruptcy. Discrimination in treatment among debtor groups must
be kept to a minimum and must be supported by solid and compelling
policy concerns that clearly override the fresh start goal which underlies
bankruptcy.325 If the student loan provision under § 523(a)(8) remains in
effect, and the student's financial condition continues to be of paramount
concern in determining the appropriateness of discharge, then courts should
take into consideration the student debtor's economic well-being relative to
his or her educational experience. The student debtor already is attempting
a new "start" in life as a result of the education procured by the debt he or
she is now trying to discharge in bankruptcy. It would seem to be necessary
to show that the student's condition would have to deteriorate below what
it would have been without the student loan before discharge is warranted.
That is, if the student went into the loan agreement poor, it is probable that
the student will remain poor for some time after graduation. Exceptionally
bad luck, such as a catastrophic illness, could then be construed as changing
the student's condition from bad to worse. In short, a reasonable rule would
seem to be that the student's condition would have to change irrespective of
the student loan before discharge is warranted. This variable is acknowl-

323. 165 B.R. 258 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).
324. 165 B.R. at 260.
325. In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 742 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing the position of the House
Judiciary Committee and its Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights which opposed
treating student loan debtors differently than other loan debtors). H.R. REP. No. 595, at 132,
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6093.
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edged at the present time in the Johnson, Brunner, and Bryant tests. 326 It
presupposes a debilitating condition beyond the control of the debtor and it
would deny discharge to debtors with self-imposed hardships.327
Again, this approach supports the need for deferral or partial discharge
rather than an "all or nothing" solution. Also, if the debtor's financial
circumstances are to determine the former student's right to a discharge,
then it is only appropriate that the courts look at the education received. If
the education is considered to be a type of fresh start for the debtor, then the
court should look to see if it really has provided a "step up." Otherwise, the
debtor does not have the assumed fresh start and should not be dealt with
as if he or she were in better shape because of the training or education.
One commentator has argued that the type of education received should be
a variable, positing that a student enrolled at a "'fly by night"' trade school
would not have the same "enhanced opportunity" as a student at a legitimate
college or university. 32 Several decisions also have taken this factor into
consideration, 329 although a number of courts, as discussed earlier, have
decidedly rejected its relevance.330
The same kind of caution against discrimination in treatment of a
debtor group seems especially warranted in Chapter 12 cases, but for the
protection of creditors rather than debtors. The presumption seems to be
made in some bankruptcy courts that the family farmer debtor should be
assured more than a fresh start. The farmer in essence is set up for success
by total forgiveness of all unsecured debt. Oftentimes, the family farmer
concludes a rehabilitative bankruptcy with all, or a significant portion, of the
debtor's assets, but with the debtor's debts wiped clean. It is as though the
326. In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. 532, 538 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that "'Extraordinary expenses' would be non-discretionary payments which required a debtor to expend
more each month than the minimal cost of necessities .... Unique medical expenses might
be considered an 'extraordinary expense."'); In re Brunner, 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that "[r]equiring evidence not only of current inability to pay but also of additional,
exceptional circumstances, strongly suggestive of continuing inability to repay over an
extended period of time, more reliably guarantees that the hardship presented is 'undue."');
In re Bryant, 72 B.R. 913, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that "if the debtor's income
does not fall at or near the poverty guidelines, a finding of 'undue hardship' could result
from the presence of 'unique' or 'extraordinary' circumstances which impose a financial
burden that would render it unlikely that the debtor would ever be able to honor such
obligations. Such circumstances are more than an 'unpleasantness' associated with the
repayment of the educational debt.").
327. Perkins v. Vermont Student Assistance Corp., 11 B.R. 160, 161 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1980) (debtor purchasing an expensive automobile).
328. Pollack & Hicks, supra note 311, at 1638-39.
329. In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 543.
330. In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 919.
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debtor had unofficially taken a Chapter 7 liquidation--that is, a de facto
Chapter 7 case. Not only is the debtor not expected to pay unsecured creditors but unsecured creditors, unwittingly (or unwillingly), provide the stake
to allow the debtor to keep on farming after the plan is concluded.
There is a real world out there for farmers as for all economic
performers. All business people and consumers need to approach credit and
debt with great care. Non-farmer borrowers who get in trouble with loans
do not have the assurance either that ill-conceived loans will be forgiven or
that they will, nonetheless, have protection against the need to borrow in the
future. There are few guarantees provided in a market economy. Too easy
debt forgiveness is a hazardous approach to responsible monetary management in any endeavor.
Part of the re-assessment of the bankruptcy fresh start issue may
require confronting the basic question of why the Code is more generous to
farmers than to students. The policy seems to be more emotionally-based
than rationally-conceived. There seems to be a "Norman Rockwell,"
nostalgic bias for farmers which shows up in the political favoritism of
Chapter 12 treatment of unsecured debt. The Code is far less generous to
students who are presumed guilty of abuse of the system and who thereby
are held to a harsher fresh start standard. This prejudice arose because of
documented cases of actual abuse and special treatment for students. It is
questionable, however, that abuse was sufficiently rampant to require such
drastic measures to contain it. Basic conditions underlying these beliefs and
prejudices may have changed. The Report of the Bankruptcy Commission
was the basis for the § 523(a)(8)(B) "undue hardship" requirement for
exception to discharge. This advisory document could remain as the
underlying guidance for any future legislation if the rationale in the 1993
decision, In re Fox, were to be followed: that the "minimal standard of
living" standard should be interpreted "so as to allow the Debtor the
3
economic wherewithal to lend reality to the concept of 'fresh start.' 011
CONCLUSION

Congress needs to revisit both student loan and family farmer debt. If
conditions are not what they were once perceived to be, then the need for
disparate treatment may also change. Student accessibility to bankruptcy
relief was reined in by Congress nearly twenty years ago. A need for
reining in of farm bankruptcy rules and policy, especially in the area of
defining reasonable, actual, and necessary operating expenses and disposable
331. 163 B.R. at 980.
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income, may be appropriate today. It is time to reconsider the decisionmaking in the student loan area, or at least to evaluate the remedy chosen
by Congress to deal with any perceived abuses. Permitting the status quo
in either bankruptcy context without further investigation perpetuates disparate treatment of debtors.

